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DENNIS T. YASUTOMO AND TOMOAKI ISHIGAKI

Japan’s Proactive Multilateralism
The UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2013
ABSTRACT

Japan’s 2013 UN Arms Trade Treaty diplomacy exhibited neither the standard
minimalist, subservient negotiating style nor policymaking restricted to the usual
actors. Juxtaposition of the treaty and the 2014 arms export policy revision illustrates
how traditional ‘‘peace diplomacy’’ can evolve into ‘‘proactive pacifism.’’
K E Y W O R D S : Japan, UN, arms trade, diplomacy, negotiating style

I N THE EARLY 1990S , JAPAN EMBARKED on a decades-long multilateral diplomatic effort to monitor and regulate the transfer and use of conventional
weapons. In 1991, Japan joined the European Community in proposing the
establishment of an arms registration system, the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA). The creation of key international weapons frameworks followed, including the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (1997), the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008),
and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (POA, 2001).
Japan’s most signiﬁcant diplomatic effort came in 2006, when it coauthored with six other nations a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that evolved into the landmark UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of 2013.
The UNGA approved the ATT on April 2, 2013; Japan’s cabinet deposited
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the instrument of acceptance on May 9, 2014 and the treaty took effect on
December 24.1
Throughout the multiyear ATT negotiation process, Japan assumed an
active leadership role in bringing transparency and accountability to the
global arms trade through a range of diplomatic activities, including cooperating with like-minded states, hosting gatherings, bridging gaps, working
with international civil society (ICS) organizations, and contributing to the
wording of the treaty text.2 These proactive efforts belie the traditional depiction of Japanese foreign policy as an essentially passive, reactive, norm-derived
exercise in coping with the international environment through deference to the
United States, with little independent initiative-taking. A typical example of
what had been dubbed ‘‘probe, push, and panic’’ diplomacy was the proceedings of the UN Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS) from the early 1970s
into the 1980s. Michael Blaker provides a stinging assessment of an almost
directionless negotiating style that managed to contribute not a single sentence
to the Law of the Sea Convention despite the critical importance of an international regime governing the sea that surrounds the island country of Japan.3
Japanese UN diplomacy entered a transitional stage in the post-UNCLOS
1990s. Oshiba Ryo noted that UN-centric diplomacy, a core diplomatic pillar
in the 1950s, faded from the scene during the Cold War, returning in the
1990s through participation in peacekeeping operations and promoting international norms, especially human security.4 Reinhard Drifte argued that this
activism merely reﬂected traditional diplomatic patterns that were carried
over into UN diplomacy, namely US-centrism and gaiatsu (external pressure)
1. For the text, see United Nations, Arms Trade Treaty, <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.
amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>.
2. For analyses of Japan’s ATT diplomacy, see Tomoaki Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future by
Studying the Past: A Negotiator’s Perspective on the Arms Trade Treaty,’’ Japanese Yearbook of
International Law 57 (2014): 371–414; ‘‘Buki Boueki Joyaku no Seiritsu to Nihon no Yakuwari’’ [The
adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty and Japan’s role], Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi [Journal of International Law and Diplomacy] 112:3 (2013): 52–75.
3. Michael K. Blaker, ‘‘Probe, Push, and Panic: The Japanese Tactical Style in International
Negotiation,’’ in Robert Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977): 55–102; ‘‘Evaluating Japan’s Diplomatic Performance,’’ in Gerald L. Curtis, ed.,
Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993): 1–42.
4. Oshiba Ryo, ‘‘Takokkan Gaiko to Takokkan-shugi—Kokuren, G8, G20, Buretton Udzu
Kikan’’ [Multilateral diplomacy and multilateralism: UN, G8, G20, Bretton Woods institutions], in
Oshiba Ryo, ed., Nihon Gaiko: Kadai-Hen, Dai-Go-ken, [Japan’s foreign policy: Themes, vol. 5]
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013): 298–300.
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as the key formative force behind what might be called Japan’s reactive
multilateral activism: ‘‘The Japan-US framework seems to be the strongest
incentive for the vigour and direction of Japan’s multilateral diplomacy. It
works by way of US pressure on Japan for international burden sharing.’’
Japan’s multilateral mission, Drifte asserted, was ‘‘to assist its American ally
[to] soften friction with multilateral institutions, not to pursue an active
autonomous diplomatic agenda.’’5
Ueki Yasuhiro, who served in the UN, acknowledged Japan’s ‘‘resilient
passivism’’ and ‘‘extreme wariness toward the use of force and involvement in
realpolitik,’’ but also noted that ‘‘support for a strengthened United Nations
has become identical, in the eyes of many Japanese, with Japan’s increased
international role and responsibilities.’’ In the 1990s, however, this activism
still consisted only of ‘‘half successful’’ ‘‘indirect contributions,’’ with ‘‘political realism . . . still in the making.’’6 Fukushima Akiko identiﬁed the emergence of a post-UNCLOS theme of ‘‘international cooperation’’ and a move
beyond bilateralism, with multilateral diplomacy providing instructive lessons on ‘‘how to use coalition politics, to which Japan is not yet accustomed.’’
She predicted that multilateralism would ‘‘compel Japan to be more proactive
rather than reactive in its foreign policy,’’ with the UN, ‘‘despite its shortcomings,’’ being ‘‘a natural organization for Japan to place at the core of its
multilateral foreign policy.’’7
After intense criticism of Japan’s ‘‘checkbook diplomacy’’ during the 1990
Gulf War, calls for ‘‘normality’’ increased in Japan. Ozawa Ichiro’s clarion call
for Japan’s transformation into a ‘‘normal nation.’’ Ozawa’s ‘‘normality’’
revolved not around the usual manifestation of enhanced military power but
on expanding the mission of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to include UN
peacekeeping operations, which started with Cambodia.8 Japan adopted human
security as a foreign policy pillar, creating the UN Trust Fund for Human
Security in 1999, with special attention given to small arms and light weapons
(SALW) issues. UN diplomacy reached new heights after 9/11. In 2003, Japan
5. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or
Justice? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 56–57.
6. Yasuhiro Ueki, ‘‘Japan’s UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism,’’ in Curtis, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 247–48.
7. Akiko Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 84.
8. Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha
International, 1994).
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assumed the role of lead country for demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan, working closely with the UN Development
Program (UNDP) and other agencies in reintegration efforts, and joined the
multinational force created through UN Security Council resolutions in Iraq.9
By the time Japan co-sponsored the ATT resolution in 2006, its UN
diplomacy could not easily be depicted as passive, reactive or subservient.
It had been co-sponsoring annual UN resolutions on SALWs with Colombia
and South Africa, citing ‘‘Japan’s long-held view that the transfer of arms
should be prohibited when they were used in violation of international obligations, such as humanitarian law or relevant UN Security Council resolutions.’’10 Nor did Japan’s ATT policy serve as an extension of US arms trade
policy. The US, the world’s largest arms exporter, initially stood aloof from
the ATT and only signed on after a change in administrations and concerted
mediatory efforts by Japan and other signatories. Japan’s role in ATT negotiations illustrated the materialization of Fukushima’s ‘‘coalition politics,’’
with a dose of normative considerations and proactive independence.
Signiﬁcantly, the Japanese Diet ratiﬁed the ATT unanimously. Therefore, the policymaking milieu warrants a reconsideration of several current
assumptions about Japan’s policymaking process to explain this proactive
diplomacy. The popular focus on Kantei gaiko (prime ministerial diplomacy) must be tempered and incorporated into a broader policymaking
context relatively devoid of strife between politicians and bureaucrats, with
a rather traditional Foreign Ministry–led conﬁguration for UN diplomacy.11
The emergence of Japan’s civil society since the 1980s has been noted,
especially on issues involving strong humanitarian normative appeal in
alliances with international NGOs, as seen in the politician-NGO-INGO
alliance that proved essential in forging support among political leaders and
bureaucrats for the Ottawa Convention.12 In the ATT case, it was the
9. Dennis T. Yasutomo, Japan’s Civil-Military Diplomacy: The Banks of the Rubicon (London:
Routledge, 2014), chapters 2–4.
10. Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future,’’ 378.
11. Drifte, Japan’s Quest, 63–64. For an analysis of prime ministerial diplomacy, see Shinoda
Tomohito, ‘‘Gaiko ni Okeru Seiji Shudou’’ [Political leadership in diplomacy], in Inoue Toshikazu,
Hatano Sumio, et al., eds., Nihon no Gaiko: Nihon Gaiko no Sai-Kochiku, Dai-Rokken [Japan’s foreign
policy: Reconstructing Japan’s foreign policy, vol. 6] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013): 147–76.
12. Keiko Hirata, Civil Society in Japan: The Growing Role of NGOs in Tokyo’s Aid Development
Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Kenki Adachi, ‘‘Why Japan Signed the Mine Ban
Treaty: The Political Dynamics behind the Decision,’’ Asian Survey 45:3 (May/June 2005): 397–413.
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formative relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and
ICS actors that took the spotlight.
Drifte’s study of UN diplomacy in the 1990s identiﬁed one consequence of
what he saw as the absence of Japanese political leadership: ‘‘failure to integrate certain issues into a more relevant political context, thus reinforcing the
reactive character of Japanese foreign policy and multilateral diplomacy in
general.’’13 Prime ministerial leadership actually did provide a broader political context for the ATT. On April 1, 2014, the cabinet adopted the Three
Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. The policy
enabled Japan to engage in the transfer of weaponry abroad. This policy
replaced the Three Principles on Arms Exports forged by the Sato Eisaku
cabinet in 1967 and strengthened by the Miki Takeo cabinet in 1976, basically
forbidding Japanese arms exports as part of Japan’s ‘‘peace diplomacy.’’ In
other words, Japan appears to have entered the global arms trade at the
precise moment it was pledging through the ATT to monitor and curtail
such trade.
It is tempting to assume that the Japanese government took advantage
of an international norm rooted in a paciﬁst peace diplomacy to camouﬂage its transformation into a full-ﬂedged arms trader. This certainly ﬁts
the narrative of a cabinet intent on strengthening national security through
greater attention to hard power and its instruments. However, two different ruling party coalitions presided over parallel policy tracks that reﬂected
different sets of policy processes, which resulted in the melding of these
tracks. In reality, Japan had already been transferring defense equipment
under the old Three Principles as special cases. Therefore, the ATT
evolved into a policy that addressed the ascent of Asian countries, including China, in the global arms trade, and legitimized Japan’s own limited
entry into arms transfers in accordance with the international law and
treaty regulations it helped draft. In other words, the political context of
the ATT and the new Three Principles emerged through a pragmatic and
incremental process that illustrates how traditional peace diplomacy is
evolving into what is now called proactive paciﬁsm, or a diplomacy that
aspires to contribute more actively to global peace efforts through international cooperation.

13. Drifte, Japan’s Quest, 63–64.
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THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S PROACTIVE MULTILATERALISM

ATT diplomacy consisted of a long-term incremental process that established
international humanitarian laws built on existing norms pertaining to the
transfer of conventional weapons. In the words of British Foreign Secretary
William Hague in 2014, ‘‘This Treaty will help make the world safer, by
placing human rights and international law at the heart of the decisions about
the arms trade. For the ﬁrst time, countries have agreed on international rules
governing everything from small arms to warships.’’14 The normative and
universal legal aspirations contrast signiﬁcantly with previous arms control
objectives and methods.
After World War II, disarmament generally pertained to weapons of mass
destruction, especially nuclear weapons, while efforts to control and regulate
the export of conventional arms focused on national security and commercial
interests primarily involving the major Western nations producing weapons
and dual-use items. The mechanisms reﬂected Cold War efforts to control
the ﬂow of goods and technology to the Soviet Union, inaugurated in 1950 by
the informal Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM). These agreements operated on the basis of consensus
decision-making, with implementation left to the discretion of participating
nations. Japan had been actively engaged in the key proceedings in the 1970s
and 1980s but violated COCOM rules in 1987, when the Toshiba Machine
Company provided the Soviets with technology that allowed the manufacture of difﬁcult-to-detect submarine propellers, resulting in the strengthening
of control over dual-use equipment exports.15
With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the international community focused more intently on conventional weapons, with the UN considered the appropriate forum for such deliberations. Many states took special
note of the negative humanitarian and social impact of unregulated arms
trading and sought to move beyond the voluntary nature of previous arrangements for reporting transfers, toward internationally binding regulations.
14. Jo Adamson and Guy Pollard, ‘‘The Arms Trade Treaty: Making a Difference,’’ chapter 9 in
Veriﬁcation and Implementation: A Biennial Collection of Analysis on International Agreements for
Security and Development 2015 (December 2015), 143, <http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/
VI%202015/VI%20Chapter%209.pdf>, accessed July 29, 2016.
15. Cindy Whang, ‘‘The Challenges of Enforcing International Military-Use Technology Export
Control Regimes: An Analysis of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty,’’ Wisconsin International
Law Journal 33 (Spring 2015): 123–25, 129–30.

962  ASIAN SURVEY 57:5

Discussions began to coalesce around the necessity for greater transparency of
the arms trade, especially through national reporting of those transfers. These
were the key mechanisms on which Japan would expend much of its diplomatic efforts during ATT negotiations.
Japan’s active engagement in arms issues since the 1990s involved a mixture
of normative and pragmatic objectives, ranging from concern over the tragic
toll of human devastation, through the use of SALWs in war-torn environments, to the ascent of Asia, especially in the late 2000s, as a major market for
arms sales and purchases. Japan contributed funding for the creation of the
Small Arms Trust Fund in the UN (2000), joined in creating the POA,
a non-binding international agreement (2001), provided the president of the
Biennial Meeting of States (2003), and served as facilitator of the Second
POA Review Conference (2012).16
This activism came against the backdrop of SDF and humanitarian aid
worker dispatches to fragile and failing states, where they were exposed to
SALWs, resulting, for example, in the slaying of a Japanese NGO worker and
a police ofﬁcer in Cambodia. By the early 2000s, Tokyo’s ‘‘peace consolidation diplomacy’’ involved cooperation with UN DDR efforts in Africa, especially Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, after which Japan sent
troops to Iraq and co-led the DDR effort with the UNDP in Afghanistan,
where Japan lost another NGO volunteer in 2008.17
By this time, Japan considered small arms, as stated by then Foreign
Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko, to be at ‘‘the nexus of peace and development’’
and intricately related to other problems, ranging from child soldiers to postconﬂict reconstruction and nation-building.18 While most arms experts did
not consider SALWs weapons of mass destruction in the same way as nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, Japanese did consider them ‘‘de facto
WMDs’’ because of their devastating impact on the human security of huge
swaths of a nation’s population. This had been a major rationale of Japan’s
support for the Ottawa Convention (mines) and the Oslo Convention (cluster bombs). The problem was the absence of the major producers and users of
16. Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future,’’ 378–79.
17. Yasutomo, Japan’s Civil-Military Diplomacy, 26–72.
18. Yoriko Kawaguchi, ‘‘Statement by H.E. Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Special Assistant to the
Prime Minister of Japan at the Open Debate of the Security Council on Small Arms, 17 February
2005,’’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2005/un0502-3.
html>, accessed July 29, 2016.
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such weaponry in the signatories of these conventions. This led, in part, to
efforts by Japan and other nations, supported by INGOs, to build on the
normative achievements of these conventions, regardless of their shortcomings, to establish international legal standards through an ATT.19
It was at this juncture that a number of states proposed the Draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers, calling for a legally binding agreement on transfers. This was the result of efforts by an INGO created
in 2003, the Control Arms campaign, which managed to gain the support of
the United Kingdom, itself a global arms exporter. On July 24, 2006, Japan
joined Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Kenya, and the UK in
co-authoring a draft UNGA resolution, ‘‘Towards an Arms Trade Treaty:
Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export and
Transfer of Conventional Arms’’ (A/RES/61/89).20 The resolution called for
a convention that would establish common international standards for the
import, export, and transfer of conventional arms through a legally binding
arms trade treaty. According to the UN Ofﬁce for Disarmament Affairs, the
ATT was to be ‘‘largely a normative treaty’’ facilitating transparency and
a responsible arms trade.21 The UNGA adopted the resolution with 153 votes
in favor; China, India, and Russia abstaining; and the United States against.
The resolution mandated the UN secretary-general to create a Group of
Government Experts, established in 2008 with representatives from 28 states,
that recommended the formation of the Open-Ended Working Group, convened twice in 2009. Based on these efforts, the UNGA adopted Resolution
64/48, calling for preparatory meetings to pave the way for a conference on
the arms trade. In 2011, the UNGA called for the convening in 2012 of the
UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. The 2012 conference ended
without the requisite consensus on a treaty text because a number of key
states, including the US, Russia, and India, called for continued negotiations
to improve and clarify the ﬁnal text.

19. Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future,’’ 382.
20. Adamson and Pollard, ‘‘Arms Trade Treaty,’’ 149. See also Helena Whall and Allison Pytlak,
‘‘The Role of Civil Society in the International Negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty,’’ Global Policy
5:4 (November 2014): 4, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12173/full>, accessed
August 22, 2016.
21. United Nations Ofﬁce for Disarmament Affairs, ‘‘Arms Trade Treaty Implementation Toolkit:
Module I: Why Join the Arms Trade Treaty?’’ 4, 9, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/2015-09-04-Toolkit-all-10-modules-FINAL.pdf>, accessed November 1, 2016.
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The impasse pushed the ATT conference back to March 18–28, 2013. Conference participants elected Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia as president of the proceedings. Woolcott approached the new conference well aware
of the magnitude of the divisions among the contending parties and appointed
facilitators to formulate various provisions of the treaty, including weaponry,
ammunition, transactions, defense cooperation agreements, and other matters.
The facilitator-led deliberations resulted in a draft treaty text. However, Iran,
North Korea, and Syria prevented the consensus required for adoption.
The threat of a second failure of the conference led to 11 countries, including Japan, abandoning the consensus rule by pushing the draft onto the ﬂoor
of the UNGA for a vote. On April 2, 2013, the UNGA adopted the ATT by
a vote of 154 to 3 (Iran, North Korea, and Syria), with 23 abstentions. By this
point, the Barack Obama administration shifted from the George W. Bush
administration’s opposition to ATT to support and co-sponsorship of the
draft. The ATT was opened for signing at UN headquarters on June 2, 2013,
and took effect on December 24, 2014. Few international treaties have taken
effect as quickly.22

ATT NEGOTIATIONS: THE JAPAN FACTOR

The level of Japanese engagement over the entire seven-year period of ATT
negotiations was unusually high. Japan’s involvement included serving as vice
chair of the Asia-Paciﬁc group at both the 2012 and 2013 conferences; hosting
a regional meeting for NGOs in Tokyo (2009) and co-hosting a follow-up
meeting in Malaysia with the UN Regional Center for Peace and Development (2012); continued support for the Small Arms Trust Fund (2012–13);
and assisting in creating an online database for the UNRCA. Woolcott also
appointed Ambassador Amano Mari of the Japanese delegation to the Conference on Disarmament to serve as one of the facilitators overseeing the ﬁnal
draft of the treaty section on brokering. Ultimately, after the ATT’s launch,
Japan would become the largest contributor to its operational budget.
Two distinctive features of Japan’s negotiating approach stand out: ‘‘coalition politics’’ in shaping the wording of the text, and its partnership with
ICS organizations. We focus on the ﬁrst feature in this section and turn to
ICS organizations in the following section.
22. Adamson and Pollard, ‘‘Arms Trade Treaty,’’ 143.
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As anticipated by Fukushima, Japan engaged extensively with a cohort of
like-minded states in supporting the treaty and in mediating differences when
delegates became less like-minded. Japan’s effective mediation is credited
with breaking logjams over controversial text issues. It should be noted that
like-minded states did not correspond to regional groupings. Japan’s spokesperson role for Asian nations must be considered nominal because of the
hesitation of a number of regional countries with regard to stringent monitoring of arms ﬂows.
Japan focused on legal obligations related to the criteria governing prohibition and risk assessment of arms transfers (Article 6) and implementation of
national reporting (Article 13). Japan’s reference for the wording of the text lay
largely in the cumulative lessons learned from experiences with international
agreements on conventional weapons, disarmament, and human rights.
MOFA assigned legal and disarmament experts from Tokyo and Geneva
to the delegation to monitor clauses pertaining to transparency, accountability, inclusivity, and enforcement through the binding authority of international law.
The ATT parts ways with existing conventions on the issue of prohibition.
While some latitude is granted to states, prohibition is absolute if tied to
speciﬁc risks associated with the illegal use of weapons. National reporting is
essential because of the opposition of many states to the creation of a monitoring or supranational enforcement mechanism, with the effectiveness of
the treaty dependent on reporting by states. Japan played a mediatory role
between contending views on risks associated with transfers in Article 6, and
it shifted to a vigorous advocacy role on the issue of transparency and
accountability in Article 13.
Article 6 has been called the heart of the ATT, because it prohibits the
wanton transfer of conventional arms in violation of international obligations, including UN arms embargoes.23 The ﬁrst two sections of Article 6
prohibit weapons transfers that violate UN Security Council sanctions or the
obligations of a state under international agreements to which it is a party.
Unlike mines and cluster bombs, transfers of designated conventional weapons are not prohibited. Many states wish to sell, and many more nations wish
23. Geneva Academy, The Arms Trade Treaty (2013), Academy Brieﬁng No. 3, Geneva Academy
of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, June 2013, 23, <http://www.snis.ch/system/
ﬁles/academy_brieﬁng_3_2013_arms_trade_treaty.pdf>, accessed August 8, 2016).
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to acquire, such weapons. This elevated the importance of establishing rules
to govern the transfers, especially since states are tasked with enforcing these
rules, not an international agency. This, in turn, heightened the importance
of producing national reports annually detailing arms transfers and how these
transfers complied with ATT provisions. Japan and its cohorts believed that
these reports would ‘‘not only make States accountable to their arms agreements, but also improve transparency, promote dialogue, and build conﬁdence among State Parties.’’24
Much of the discussion focused on the third section of Article 6, which
speciﬁcally prohibits arms transfers for the execution of serious violations of
international law and norms. According to one study, ‘‘Article 6(3) is potentially one of the most important provisions in the ATT and the success of its
implementation will be one of the main yardsticks by which the treaty as
a whole will be judged.’’ In essence, the article prohibits the transfer of
conventional weapons when the state is aware that such transfer would
contribute to the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or certain
war crimes.25
Initially, the draft wording of Article 6 constituted one of the main obstacles to agreement on the ATT.26 A contingent of states, led by the US,
pushed for clear and limited prohibitions on arms sales with a reference to
intent and speciﬁc provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The original draft
of Article 6(3) read:
A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms within the
scope of this Treaty for the purpose of facilitating the commission of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes constituting grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, or serious violations of common article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.

The phrase ‘‘for the purpose of ’’ suggested the need to demonstrate that
states were providing arms speciﬁcally to commit genocide and crimes
against humanity. The majority of countries, however, felt that ‘‘few states
would knowingly authorize a transfer of arms for the limited purpose of
committing genocide.’’ In addition, the draft speciﬁcally referenced the
24. Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future,’’ 397.
25. Geneva Academy, Arms Trade Treaty, 24.
26. All passages cited in this discussion of Article 6, including Japanese text proposals, can be
found in Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future,’’ 399–404.
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Geneva Conventions rather than the broader set of international humanitarian norms that were considered to be customary international law.27
The Japanese sided with the majority view that shifted the focus away from
the intent-based ‘‘for the purpose of facilitating’’ to a more ‘‘knowledgebased’’ criterion. They proposed that:
A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered
under Article 2(1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has
knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in
the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes as deﬁned
by international agreements to which it is a Party, including those under the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The Japanese proposal shifted the provision toward the assumption that
states were not likely to support genocide consciously, rendered the intentbased wording less restrictive and the transfer more conditional, and omitted
the reference to the Geneva Conventions’ ‘‘Common Article 3’’ by subsuming
it within a wider range of ‘‘international agreements.’’
The Japanese delegation facilitated a compromise wording through deliberations with knowledge-based and intent-based parties, in close consultation
with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Key actors included
Australia, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, the chief advocate of
intent-based wording. Japan focused not only on attaining US agreement but
also on bringing together states not committed to US participation, arms
exporters and importers opposed to strong restrictions on their activities,
states devastated by illicit arms, and parties determined to stand on the moral
high ground. The compromise wording based on the Japanese proposal
opened the door to agreement by all parties:
A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered
under Article 2(1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has
knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in
the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians
protected as such, or other war crimes as deﬁned by international agreements to
which it is a Party.

27. Ibid., 399.
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The compromise wording retained the possibility of intent-based transfers
by some arms providers and speciﬁed potential violations, but also retained
the term ‘‘international agreements,’’ extending the application of international law beyond the Geneva Conventions, especially its Additional Protocols, which extended the coverage of the conventions and elaborated on the
rules of armed conﬂict.
On Article 13, Japan played less of a catalytic or mediatory role, engaging in
forceful advocacy.28 It sought mandatory reporting and broad distribution of
these reports to the public. From the Japanese perspective, the publication
and dissemination of arms export and import transaction reports was the key
method for ensuring transparency, and essential to holding states accountable
for treaty violations. This strong push for reporting was a reaction against
states opposed to the establishment of inspection or veriﬁcation mechanisms.
Many states maintained that since arms trading was legal and necessarily
conﬁdential, ‘‘the establishment of a group of inspectors to determine if
a legitimate arms transfer conducted by a state in accordance with its domestic laws and regulations was unnecessary and impractical.’’29 Therefore,
Japan, like-minded states, and civil society groups did not attempt to create
a supra-national oversight body, focusing instead on improving monitoring
procedures by adopting provisions found in existing frameworks, especially
UNRCA, despite their imperfections.
States remained deeply divided on whether national reporting should be
mandatory, and on whether these reports should be available to the public.
On this issue, Japan’s position was clear: ‘‘Japan was a principal State advocating for both mandatory reporting and publication since the July 2012
Conference.’’ Japanese concerns were reﬂected in a proposed insertion in
one of the early treaty drafts underlining the importance of transparency:
‘‘Promote cooperation, transparency and responsibilities of States Parties in
the trade in conventional arms, thus building conﬁdence among States Parties.’’30 The clause was opposed by North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela.
In March 2013, the Japanese worked closely with Costa Rica and Lithuania
on a joint statement on mandatory reporting, presented by Lithuania, which
garnered the support of 37 states, followed by a second statement supported
28. Ibid., 404–09.
29. Ibid., 404.
30. Ibid., 405.
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by 62 countries.31 The drafters continued to confront strong opposition to
mandatory reporting from some states. However, the group sensed a rough
consensus forming that might allow the Secretariat to distribute national
transaction reports to other states that agreed to submit reports. The eventual
acceptance of dissemination to other states opened the door for Japan, Costa
Rica, and Lithuania to seek expansion of access beyond states.
The three nations submitted a proposal for a March 2013 treaty draft that
would make reporting immediate (within a year of ratiﬁcation), mandatory,
and public. Article 10, ‘‘Reporting and Recordkeeping,’’ read (emphasis ours):
4. Each State Party shall, within the ﬁrst year after entry into force of this
Treaty for that State Party, provide an initial report to the secretariat of relevant
activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national
laws, regulations and administrative measures. States Parties shall report on any
new activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available and public by the secretariat. . . .
5. Each State Party shall submit annually to the secretariat by 1 July a report for
the preceding calendar year concerning the authorization or actual transfer of
conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty. Reports shall be made
available and public and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. . . .

Several states continued to oppose mandatory reporting or sought to
weaken it through word changes (e.g., ‘‘should’’ rather than ‘‘shall’’). The
dissemination issue required extensive maneuvering by the troika. Ultimately, the ﬁnal version of the ATT replaced ‘‘and public’’ with a mere
comma, but a powerful one. Articles 10(4) and 10(5) in the draft treaty
became Articles 13(1) and 13(3) in the ﬁnal draft. The ﬁnal sentences in 13(1)
and 13(3) both read: ‘‘Reports shall be made available, and distributed to
States Parties by the Secretariat.’’ Without the comma, states appear to be
the sole recipients of these reports. The comma ‘‘disconnects the object of the
dissemination of the reports,’’ making it ‘‘not possible to assert that the
circulation is limited only to the State Parties.’’ In other words, ‘‘the new
sentence structure provides a clear opening for the reports to be distributed to
interested parties other than States Parties.’’32 ‘‘Reports shall be made available
[comma]’’ thus provided the basis for the Secretariat to disseminate the reports
31. Ibid., 406; see also Whall and Pytlak, ‘‘Role of Civil Society,’’ 6–7.
32. Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future,’’ 408, note 79.
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publicly to civil society organizations that wished to monitor compliance, as
well as to states parties. Thus, eventually, the troika prevailed, as most states
came to accept obligatory national reporting, but with the form of these reports
unspeciﬁed in the treaty text and thus left to the discretion of the states.
In the end, the ATT negotiations were an instance of distinctive, sprawling, multi-year multilateral diplomacy.
The negotiating process itself was marked by the emergence of a number of
coalitions and like-minded groups. The co-authors were made up of exporters
and importers from different continents, with the aim of working regionally as
well [as] internationally at the United Nations. Control Arms brought together
a wide range of different civil society groups, including NGOs, parliamentarians, medical professionals, survivors of conﬂicts, and regional groupings.
Industry added their own thoughts on practical implementation particularly
on how to manage ‘‘parts and components.’’ Some countries caucused on the
basis of regional arrangements. Others clustered to advance speciﬁc issues such
as gender-based violence and sustainable development. Leadership was shared
among individuals and coalitions. Crucially, the UN political groupings were
split and redundant. States were freer to engage with like-minded states and
drive common agendas. The two chairs pushed UN member states towards
consensus but expected delegates to engage in genuine negotiations and drafting. The ﬁnal text contains echoes of speeches and written contributions from
numerous delegations.33

The process yielded several ‘‘ﬁrsts’’: the treaty ‘‘was not born through an
already-established practice’’; ‘‘it moves beyond the focus solely on illicit trade
and requires states to assess the potential negative consequences of arms exported in legitimate transfers’’; and ‘‘transparency is also at its heart, again
moving away from voluntary political arrangements toward obliging states’’
to keep records and reports on their transactions. The results reﬂected ‘‘constructive ambiguity,’’ raising questions about implementation and omissions.34
Japan accepted the ATT as representing ‘‘what the international community could agree upon.’’35 Its intense effort addressed key obstacles involving
state-centric monitoring of arms sales and the legality of arms sales by exposing illicit transfers via civil society monitoring in the court of global public
opinion through codiﬁed international norms and the legitimacy of the UN.
33. Adamson and Pollard, ‘‘Arms Trade Treaty,’’ 157–58.
34. Ibid., 144.
35. Ishigaki, ‘‘Deﬁning the Future,’’ 371.
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From a Japanese perspective, the achievement of the ATT is not the creation
of a new international arms trade organization but rather the consolidation
and codiﬁcation of several existing norms that can serve as a possible deterrent
to wanton deﬁance of international public opinion backed by UN condemnation and sanctions.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE ATT IN JAPAN’S
FOREIGN POLICY

As ATT negotiations progressed, a new development reinforced Japan’s
intense focus on transparency and accountability. In 2012, Asia overtook
Europe in defense spending, with ﬁve of the 10 largest military budgets
possessed by China, Japan, India, Russia, and South Korea.36 By the following year, Asian defense spending increased by 3.6% (to US$ 407 billion),
much of it due to the increase in Chinese spending (7.4%).37 Between 2009
and 2013, China was among the ﬁve largest arms buyers in the world.38 Asian
states are major consumers but not sellers of arms—with one notable exception. China entered the top ﬁve between 2009 and 2013, with sales increasing
by 212% between 2004 and 2013, based largely on the rapid development of
its military technology.39
Amid the growing tension in bilateral relations and the regional security
environment, the China factor made it more imperative to mandate adherence to common international transaction rules and to provide national
reports accessible to public scrutiny. However, Japan did not single out
Beijing publicly for special attention in the ATT deliberations. Beijing had
already been consistently casting negative votes or abstaining. There was little
need for ﬁnger-pointing since conference participants were aware of Chinese
36. ‘‘Asia’s Defense Spending Overtakes Europe’s: IISS,’’ Reuters (March 14, 2013), <http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-security-military-iiss-idUSBRE92D0EL20130314>, accessed August 8, 2016.
37. Sam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, ‘‘Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013,’’
SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2014, <http://books.sipri.org/ﬁles/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf>, accessed August 8,
2016.
38. Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, ‘‘Trends in International Arms Transfers,
2013,’’ SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2014, <http://books.sipri.org/ﬁles/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf>, accessed
August 8, 2016.
39. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>, accessed
July 24, 2014; ‘‘China Overtakes Germany as World’s Third-Largest Arms Exporter,’’ Wall Street
Journal, March 15, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-overtakes-germany-as-worlds-thirdlargest-arms-exporter-1426460722>, accessed June 23, 2016.
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activities in troubled regions. China claimed to have been abiding by UN
Security Council sanctions on arms exports and adopted its own export
controls for military goods in the late 1990s, but its weapons had managed
to ﬁnd their way to sanctioned countries. Chinese arms transfers globalized,
starting from the initial call in 2006 for an ATT. According to one observer,
‘‘In the case of China’s arms transfers in sub-Saharan Africa (and sanctioned
nations) the record is clearer: China has not only violated UN sanctions but
sought to cover it up. . . . Worse still, a review of Chinese compliance by
SIPRI [the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] . . . uncovered
evidence that Chinese diplomats repeatedly sought to intimidate UN arms
experts and attempted to block annual reports to the Security Council.’’40
The China factor may have validated the wisdom of working under
UNGA auspices without UNSC fetters, but the Japanese pragmatically
avoided putting all the diplomatic eggs in the normative basket, understanding that international norms and UN condemnation have limited and situational efﬁcacy. The government’s lifting of the arms trade ban on the eve of
the ATT’s ratiﬁcation may thus appear to be a move to counter speciﬁcally
China’s burgeoning arms trade, but the policy shift reﬂected a much broader
policy context that incrementally wove together domestic interests, continuity with international cooperation efforts from the 1990s, and recent regional
strategic developments.
The ﬁrst major effort to lift the 1967 arms trade ban came under a coalition
cabinet led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ loosened the
weapons export ban in 2011 for SDF peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, for participation in joint development and production of weapons with
other countries, and to address the plight of the beleaguered defense industry.
Paciﬁst Japan had developed its own arms industry, but with only one
customer: its own SDF. The intent had not been to open the ﬂoodgates for
Japanese arms sales abroad. There was no expectation of an immediate boost
in sales or proﬁts. Japan did not see itself as in the same club as the US, UK,
Germany, Russia, and China. The adoption of the 2014 Three Principles on
Transfer and Defense Equipment Technology by the coalition government of
the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito reﬂected strong continuity
with DPJ policy moves, including the long-standing wish for joint weapons
40. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 305.
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production, enhancing the effectiveness of SDF’s peacekeeping operations, and
precedents for the transfer of weapons and dual-use equipment.
In reality, the DPJ move reﬂected the incremental loosening of the arms
export ban initiated by previous LDP cabinets. Exceptions had been granted
for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, with strict
screening procedures to ensure compliance with this condition, and safeguards against unintended uses of these weapons and transfers to third countries. Before 2014, chief cabinet secretaries had announced 21 weapons
equipment export approvals. These exceptions extend back to the 1983
approval of arms technology transfers to Washington during the Nakasone
Yasuhiro cabinet, the approval of cooperative missile defense technology
research after the 1998 North Korean missile launch, and the 2004 exclusion
of the Ballistic Missile Defense. Transfers were justiﬁed in 2001 in the AntiTerrorism Law, and in 2002, restrictions were waived for the export of
demining machinery and equipment, just in time for Japan’s non-military
support for multinational forces in Afghanistan. In 2003, transfers were
approved under the special legislation for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, with night-vision goggles, chemical protective gear, bulletproof
vests, and police equipment and patrol cars ﬂowing to Baghdad during
Japan’s dispatch of SDF troops in 2004–06.41 Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations also witnessed the transfer of bulldozers, power shovels, and
bucket loaders used by the SDF in locations such as Cambodia, East Timor,
and Haiti. In 2006, three patrol boats found their way to Indonesia. The
cabinet’s more recent provision of patrol boats was not a break from past
practices but a staple of export exemptions. Signiﬁcantly, dual-use equipment
had been exempted from the Three Principles on Arms Exports, and Japan
supported dual-use exemptions in the ATT negotiations as well. In a sense,
the exceptions became the rule.42

41. Yūzō Murayama, ‘‘A Review of the Three Principles on Arms Exports,’’ Nippon.com, February 9, 2012, <http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00016/>, accessed October 17, 2016; Nishikawa Yukiko, Kogata Buki ni Idomu Kokusai Kyoryoku [The challenge of small weapons for
international cooperation] (Tokyo: Soseisha, 2013), 20.
42. For the conditions under which defense equipment and technology can be transferred, along
with the text of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, see
Naikaku Kanbo [Cabinet Secretariat], Bouei Soubi Iten San-Gensoku ni Tsuite [On the three principles of defense equipment transfers], <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/bouei.html>, accessed
August 14, 2016.
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The Japanese government felt the need for joint production of weapons
with other countries as its military budgets gravitated toward negative annual
growth rates during the 2000s. The defense industry had suffered from
a shrinking domestic market because of negative budget growth and the high
cost of research and development. According to the Ministry of Defense,
more than 100 companies abandoned military equipment production
between 2003 and 2012.43 The most prominent of the weapons systems
prevented from joint development were F-35 ﬁghters and SM-3 Block IIA
missiles. The new Three Principles cleared the way for joint production with
Britain, France, and others. Whether the Japanese can be competitive after
having been blocked from this market for decades remains to be seen: expectations are low for an immediate boost in sales and proﬁts. The defense
industry’s share of total industrial output is 1%, and for even the largest
military contractor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, military equipment sales
provide only 10% of total proﬁts.44
The optics suggest Japan’s use of the front door to control the arms trade
through the ATT and the back door to sneak into the global arms trade
through the new Three Principles. ATT negotiators and cabinets viewed the
two issues as complementary, neither an anti-China measure nor the abandonment of peace diplomacy. If anything, for China’s arms trade, Japan’s approach
constituted a diplomacy based on persuasion through international law and
public opinion, not confrontation. In fact, in pushing for the monitoring of
other states, Japan potentially placed restrictions on its own transfers.

THE ATT POLICYMAKING PROCESS: SOMETHING OLD,
SOMETHING NEW

Japan’s ATT policymaking conﬁguration consisted of MOFA delegates, diplomats representing like-minded states, and ICS representatives. Traditionally,
43. Ministry of Defense, Japan, Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases: Toward
Strengthening the Bases to Support Defense Forces and ‘‘Proactive Contribution to Peace,’’ June 2014, <http://
www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubiseisaku/soubiseisakuseisan/2606honbuneigo.pdf>, accessed August 14, 2016.
44. Axel Berkofsky, ‘‘Japan’s December 2010 ‘National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)’:
The ‘Big Bang’ of Japanese Security and Defense Policies?’’ Korea Review of International Studies 14:1
(2011): 43–44, <http://gsis.korea.ac.kr/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/14-1-03_Axel_Berkofsky.pdf>,
accessed October 14, 2016; Tim Kelly, ‘‘Japan Defense Contractors Get to Grips with Foreign
Military Buyers,’’ Reuters, October 14, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-aerospace-japandefence-idUSKCN12E0D2>, accessed October 17, 2016.
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MOFA exercises jurisdiction over UN policy, and the ATT was no exception.
MOFA had been the hub around which other relevant ministries revolved,
including the Ministry of Defense; the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry; the National Police Agency; and the National Security Council. The
unanimous political support for the ATT facilitated prompt ratiﬁcation in
the Diet and reﬂected the general support for the convergence of the ATT
and the new Three Principles, which in turn illustrated the selective guidance
and coordination role played by the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce in placing the
ATT in the broader context of Japan’s foreign policy.
Japan’s engagement with ICS actors and the low-key role of domestic
NGOs constituted one of the more distinctive features of ATT diplomacy.
Japanese NGOs played pivotal roles in convincing the government to support
issues like the Mine Ban Convention, which the government was initially
hesitant to support. However, as reﬂected in the Diet’s unanimous ratiﬁcation,
the government supported the ATT from the outset, co-sponsoring the 2006
ATT resolution without much input from domestic NGOs then or thereafter.
Much has been written about the dominant role of international, more than
domestic, advocacy actors in initiating and participating in UN ATT proceedings, buoyed by deep expertise on arms trade issues. Like many states, Japan
actively sought to include ICS representatives in its deliberations. In all, 219
representatives from 46 NGOs participated in the ﬁnal ATT negotiating
conference in March 2013.45
Japan worked intimately with three nongovernmental groups in particular:
Control Arms, the Stimson Center, and SIPRI. Control Arms was the largest
coalition of civil society groups involved in the ATT process. Japan’s cooperation with Control Arms intensiﬁed after co-sponsoring the UNGA resolution
that jump-started the ATT in 2012. Control Arms, following a strategy of
working closely with self-identiﬁed ‘‘like-minded states,’’ encouraged Japan
to support more-ambitious goals for a robust treaty while encouraging a leadership role in organizing support for the ATT in the Asian region. Control
Arms viewed Japan and the other six co-authors of the ATT resolution
45. For ATT civil society contributions, see especially Whall and Pytlak, ‘‘Role of Civil Society’’;
Emily Street, ‘‘The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Disarmament Education and Advancing the
Arms Trade Treaty and Small Arms and Light Weapons Agenda,’’ in United Nations Ofﬁce for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Civil Society and Disarmament 2014: The Importance of Civil Society
in United Nations and Intergovernmental Processes: Views from Four Delegations to the United Nations
(New York: United Nations, 2015), 33–44.
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(Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Kenya, and the UK) as ‘‘brokers,’’
serving as lead countries in guiding the process to its conclusion. Control Arms
worked to forge agreement on priorities between ‘‘brokers’’ and so-called ‘‘progressive’’ forces, especially Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago, which were endeavoring to make human rights and
humanitarian principles in Article 6 more explicit.46
The Japanese found think tanks to be a fountain of knowledge based on
their long experience and expertise in weapons-related public policy activities.
They turned to the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank that had
expertise on the export control regimes of weapons systems and approached
arms control and non-proliferation issues in a practical and pragmatic manner. Japan and the Stimson Center co-organized numerous conferences in
New York to exchange ideas and to build support and momentum for the
ATT among UN members.
SIPRI’s renowned database on global arms trade and military expenditures
is used by governments and NGOs to monitor legal and illegal arms transfers
globally. In this sense, SIPRI was already playing the role of a nongovernmental watchdog over the arms trade. Japanese interests overlapped with
SIPRI expertise in transparency, compliance, and risk assessment. SIPRI
focused on how to address the implementation mechanisms of the ATT,
especially reporting. The Japanese valued SIPRI for its impartial and expert
insights on issues that were particularly contentious among negotiating delegations. The Japanese delegation felt it especially imperative to enable
SIPRI and other watchdog organizations to access national arms transfer
reports.
The Japanese regarded ties with ICS organizations as a two-way street.
They recognized that ‘‘think tanks and academia in general are essential
vehicles for fostering critical perspectives among government ofﬁcials and
in general audiences.’’47 They found ICS resources of great use for supplementing understanding of the technical dimensions of weaponry and the
arms trade, and in return, the Japanese were able to provide insights on
navigating the confusing politics-infused processes found in the UN. Not
all collaborative efforts are successful, however. For example, NGO use of
46. Whall and Pytlak, ‘‘Role of Civil Society,’’ 4–5.
47. Tomoaki Ishigaki, ‘‘Collaboration between Governments and Civil Society on Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation Education,’’ in UNODA, Civil Society and Disarmament, 17.
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testimonies of victims of SALWs had been ‘‘an effective and powerful way of
reaching out to a larger audience’’ in the case of the Mine Ban Treaty, as
Japan found in the case of atomic bomb survivor (hibakusha) testimonies.48
In the ATT case, however, ICS groups and the Japanese found key government representatives a much tougher audience as they held on tightly to more
realist national interest and sovereignty concerns.49
The US did not play a major role in forging Japan’s ATT negotiating
positions. The George W. Bush administration opposed the ATT in 2006,
and from 2009, Japan found itself mediating between a more favorably
inclined Barack Obama administration and the knowledge-based caucus.
Japan did play, to some extent, a role that Drifte led us to expect: Tokyo’s
multilateral activism seeks to smooth relations between the US and international organizations. In this case, Japan helped mediate between the US and
the majority of negotiating parties in a way that brought the US on board.
This effort was not unique to Japan but was in line with several like-minded
partners, many of them US allies as well. Japan’s own entry into the arms
trade reﬂected domestic interests and a long-standing commitment to its own
form of international cooperation, not US pressure.50

THE NORMALITY OF JAPAN’S PROACTIVE PEACE DIPLOMACY

ATT diplomacy reveals a level of proactive involvement not usually associated with Japanese diplomacy, especially when it comes to issues deﬁned
strongly by normative objectives. Japan co-authored the initial ATT Conference resolution, hosted ATT-related conferences and workshops, funded
ATT activities and UN arms transfer databases, mediated differing views
among states, and contributed to the wording of key sections of the treaty.
The policymaking conﬁguration reﬂected the centrality of MOFA, a cooperative working relationship with like-minded states, close cooperation with the
president of the ATT Conference, and the unprecedented deep partnership
with ICS actors.

48. Ibid., 14, 18.
49. Whall and Pytlak, ‘‘Role of Civil Society,’’ 7–9.
50. Sato Seigo, ‘‘Nichi-Bei-Oh no Tsujo Heiki Iten Seisaku no Hikaku’’ [Comparative study of
the conventional arms transfer policies of Japan, the US and Europe], Gunkshuku Kenkyu [Disarmament Review] 5 (2014): 56–68.
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The shift, led by the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce, to the Three Principles on
Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology over two ruling party cabinets provides the larger context of the ATT. Even though exceptions had
been made over decades, the arms transfer go-ahead may be yet another nail
in the cofﬁn of Japanese paciﬁsm on its march toward military normality.
Yet, the Three Principles were intended to enable the SDF to fulﬁll peacekeeping and humanitarian missions more effectively, not to build military
capabilities or to compete with the major global arms exporters. International
norms met national interests with the heightened recognition since the 1990s
of the devastation caused by SALWs amid the emergence of human security
as an international norm, punctuated by direct Japanese exposure to SALWs
on humanitarian and peace-building missions.
Japan’s normality can be viewed in the same vein as practices followed by
normative diplomacies like Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland, which use
the ATT to legitimize their participation in the arms trade. Therefore, the
ATT illustrates how a classic peace diplomacy instrument enables Japan to
embark on a conditional transfer of arms in line with the practices of other
ATT members, based on international law that requires transparency and
accountability. The ATT creates a strong dual obligation for Japan to effectively monitor not only the arms policies of other states, but also its own
transfers.51 To date, Japan is the only Asian country to have ratiﬁed the ATT,
and at the one-year mark, when the treaty required the ﬁrst national report on
transfers to be submitted, Japan’s report indicates strict compliance with the
rules its delegates labored hard to embed in the treaty.52 And according to
SIPRI, from 2014 to 2015, Japanese arms sales decreased by 0.8%.53
Japan’s ATT diplomacy illustrates a proactive multilateral diplomacy guided
by pragmatic national interests wrapped in normative considerations emphasizing persuasion rather than coercion. The ATT and the Three Principles on
51. Sato Seigo, ‘‘Nihon ga Buki Boueki Joyaku o Shiji-subeki Riyu’’ [Reasons why Japan should
support the Arms Trade Treaty], Gunkshuku Kenkyu (Disarmament Review) 5 (2014): 4; Sato Seigo,
‘‘Nichi-Bei-Oh,’’ 68.
52. Arms Trade Treaty Baseline Assessment Project, Reviewing Initial Reports on ATT Implementation: Analysis and Lessons Learned, 2016, Stimson Center, <https://www.stimson.org/sites/
default/ﬁles/ﬁle-attachments/The-ATT-Initial-Reports-Reviewing-ATT-Implementation-LessonsLearned.pdf>, accessed October 17, 2016.
53. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), ‘‘Arms Production,’’ 2016, <https://
www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/armsproduction>, accessed November 15, 2016.
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Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology illustrate the incremental
process by which peace diplomacy has been evolving since the 1990s toward
a normality based on accepted international practices, not on military power.
The ATT’s normality illustrates the long distance Japan must still travel if it
really does wish to attain that kind of normality.

